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Annotated Bibliography on
Independent Prison Oversight
Michele Deitch
The body of literature regarding correctional oversight is
both limited and fragmented, posing a significant challenge to
policy makers, practitioners, scholars, and advocates who seek
to engage this important issue. Indeed, much of the literature
surrounding this topic is to be found in the form of reports,
speeches, unpublished essays, and chapters of books—none of
which is easy to identify, locate, or collect. To add to the
challenge, much of the existing material comes from
international sources. This material has never been gathered
previously in one place.
In preparation for the conference ―Opening Up a Closed
World: What Constitutes Effective Prison Oversight?,‖ held at
the University of Texas in 2006, graduate students in my
seminar on ―Prisons and Human Rights‖ embarked on a major
group effort to compile and review the literature dealing with
independent oversight of prisons and to develop an annotated
bibliography of this material.


Senior Lecturer, The University of Texas at Austin-Lyndon B. Johnson
School of Public Affairs and the University of Texas School of Law. B.A.
Amherst College; M.Sc. Oxford University; J.D. Harvard Law School. The
author is grateful to the Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation for
awarding me a Soros Senior Justice Fellowship from 2005-06 to support my
research on the subject of correctional oversight.
This Annotated Bibliography was originally prepared as a research project
conducted by University of Texas graduate students in my interdisciplinary
seminar on Prisons and Human Rights during the spring of 2006. The
research for and drafting of the original 2006 bibliography was done by:
Fabiola Flores (School of Law), Crystal Jones (Lyndon B. Johnson School of
Public Affairs), Bryan McCann (Department of Journalism), and David
Wagner (School of Law). The original draft was presented to participants in
the ―Opening Up a Closed World: What Constitutes Effective Prison
Oversight?‖ conference held at the University of Texas in April 2006, a
conference that I chaired and organized. The Bibliography has since been
significantly restructured and updated. I would be grateful if readers who
identify other helpful resources can bring them to my attention, as I seek to
maintain a current database of this material. I may be reached at:
Michele.Deitch@mail.utexas.edu.
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What follows is an Annotated Bibliography1 of this
literature
and
other
resources,
representing
the
recommendations, methods, and experiences of a diverse group
of experts on the issue of independent prison oversight and
closely related issues. While the students strived to include as
much of the key literature as was feasible, this is by no means
a comprehensive listing of everything that has ever been
written on the subject. I have updated and restructured the
bibliography to include a number of important publications
issued since the 2006 conference and to recognize various
developments in this arena.
The purpose of this bibliography is to serve as a resource
for those stakeholders who wish to develop or analyze
mechanisms to enhance transparency and accountability in
correctional operations. Ideally, it will inspire some creative
thinking about the need for external prison oversight, the
various ways in which oversight mechanisms can be
structured, and the tasks to be performed by monitoring
entities.
I. Research Findings
Before turning to the Bibliography itself, it might be
instructive to provide a brief discussion and analysis of what
the literature on this topic revealed.
A. Oversight Mechanisms
Correctional oversight bodies tend to fall into one of four
categories: trans-national quasi-governmental groups; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); government agencies; and
citizen participation.
Trans-national quasi-governmental
groups such as Europe‘s Committee for the Prevention of
Torture (CPT) and the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) are independent bodies with formal rights of
access to detention facilities across nations. The United
1

Editor’s Note: This Annotated Bibliography is designed to be accessible to
those both inside and outside of the legal academic community. As such,
sources have been cited according to the author’s preference; they do not
conform to The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation.
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Nations also requires countries to submit individual reports
documenting their compliance with the Convention Against
Torture.
Human rights organizations such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch typically do not
possess the same level of access to prisons as do those transnational entities, so these NGOs gather their information
about prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners from
different sources and focus their efforts on articulating human
rights standards and recommending the development of official
oversight mechanisms. Trans-national groups and NGOs are
generally guided in their efforts by international human rights
instruments.
Many governments in other countries and, to a much
lesser degree, in the United States have created external
oversight mechanisms for prisons and jails that involve routine
monitoring. The external oversight bodies have taken different
forms, from independent Prison Inspectorates to Inspectors
General to Ombudsmen, and all have formal access to prison
facilities. Some of these are stand-alone entities, while others
are affiliated with a legislative or executive branch entity. The
literature discussed in this bibliography provides a closer look
at how some of these bodies are structured and what makes
them effective in their work.
Oversight models in a number of countries and states often
rely upon citizens to provide oversight of prisons. Trained
volunteers participate on inspection teams and on civilian
review boards, and in some cases civilian lawyers get involved
in Internal Review units.
Striking examples of civilian
involvement in oversight are found in the United Kingdom,
South Africa, New York, and Illinois, and advocates in Canada
have long called for the involvement of citizens in reviewing
agency decisions to place a prisoner in administrative
segregation.
Historically in the United States, the responsibility of
prison oversight has fallen to the federal courts, which in
extreme cases have set up offices that conduct routine
monitoring of prison facilities to ensure compliance with courtordered improvements in conditions.2 Judicial intervention
2. For example, in the landmark case of Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp.
1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), amended and vacated in part by, 688 F.2d 266 (5th
Cir. 1982). Judge William Wayne Justice set up the Office of the Special
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serves a very different function than the routine monitoring
conducted by the oversight bodies discussed here, since courts
get involved only after a facility is determined to have
unconstitutional conditions and since this type of oversight is
not intended to be ongoing in nature. There is a healthy body
of available literature on the subject of judicial intervention in
prisons, and this Bibliography only touches on this subject
briefly.3
B. Major Themes in the Literature
This literature review reveals a significant difference
between the ways imprisonment is viewed in the United States
and in other countries. Non-U.S. authors overwhelmingly
stress the need for oversight on the basis that imprisonment
and the deprivation of liberty represents the most power a
government can exercise over individuals. Such a profound
expression of state force, therefore, requires extensive scrutiny.
This rationale is conspicuously absent in most of the literature
about oversight coming from the United States, as is the
related effort to ground oversight in basic human rights
principles. While this reflects, in part, a cultural difference
among nations, presumably it also stems from a recognition on
the part of advocates in the United States that policy-makers
are more likely to be moved by arguments about the costeffectiveness of preventive oversight and the efficiencies and
improvements in prison operations that can result from outside
scrutiny.
A number of the annotated works emphasize that
oversight models must be developed to meet the specific needs,
culture, and situation of a particular jurisdiction. A ―one-sizefits-all‖ approach to oversight is unrealistic, and even the best
of models cannot be simply transferred to another jurisdiction
Master, a 10-person office responsible for monitoring conditions in all Texas
prisons and reporting to the court and the parties on the prison agency‘s
compliance with court orders. The office existed from 1981 until 1990. The
author served as a full-time court-appointed monitor in this office from 1987
to 1990.
3. One of the best sources on the topic of court oversight of prisons is a
previous volume of the PACE LAW REVIEW that contains the proceedings of the
symposium ―Prison Reform Revisited: The Unfinished Agenda,‖ 24 PACE L.
REV. (2004) (discussed infra, p. 1733).
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without modification. That said, it is striking how many of the
countries highlighted in this literature review demonstrated a
familiarity with other oversight systems and sought to create
oversight structures modeled on these bodies. The British
Prison Inspectorate is often held up as one of the most effective
oversight bodies created at a national level, and there are
oversight entities around the world that have sought to
emulate this structure.
Virtually every work describing an oversight model
stresses the importance of ―independence.‖ Independence is a
complicated concept, but at its core, it means both that an
oversight entity should be independent of the body that it
oversees and that it should exercise independence of judgment
about how to respond to the problems it identifies. Also critical
is routine monitoring—not just investigations of past
wrongdoing—in order to prevent prisoner abuse and to ensure
early detention of problems before misconduct occurs and
lawsuits are filed. Other core features of effective prison
monitoring include the need for confidentiality on the part of
those who speak with the inspectors and the ability of monitors
to work collaboratively with prison officials to ensure that
changes get implemented.
We were also struck by the extent to which the literature
on police oversight raises numerous considerations that
parallel the concerns of those interested in making prisons
more transparent and accountable. While the two types of
oversight are not by any means identical, we believe that the
literature on police oversight provides a valuable frame of
reference, especially since police oversight is currently much
more established in the United States than is correctional
oversight.
Police oversight mechanisms have some
applicability to the enterprise of monitoring prisons and jails,
and oversight practitioners in the law enforcement field have
faced many of the same challenges and questions that daunt
those who propose correctional oversight mechanisms.
Finally, we noted many instances in which the literature
references oversight of a particular aspect of prison operations
or conditions, or oversight of a particular segment of the
prisoner population. Such ―issue-specific‖ oversight tends to be
more evident in the United States, whereas in Europe and
beyond, every aspect of the prison environment is seen to
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justify external scrutiny. In the United States, for example,
there is some literature available about monitoring private
prison operations. Oversight of private prison facilities tends
to fall in most cases to the public agencies with whom the
private vendors contract. Yet oversight of private prisons and
jails poses unique challenges, because most monitoring is
limited to ensuring compliance with contractual terms. If those
underlying contracts do not contain provisions relating to the
treatment of prisoners or the quality of conditions in the
facility, as many contracts unfortunately fail to do, the ability
to monitor these facilities effectively and hold private providers
accountable for the protection of prisoners is significantly
lessened.
The annotated literature offers a number of
suggestions for those who wish to ensure greater transparency
and accountability in private prison operations.
Many of the works discussed here identify the need for
external scrutiny in order to protect inmates from sexual
assault, an issue that is receiving increasing levels of attention
in the United States in the wake of the work of the National
Prison Rape Elimination Commission and the requirements of
the Prison Rape Elimination Act.4 Similarly, many works
highlight the need to address the concerns of mentally ill and
physically disabled inmates. As the public becomes more
aware of the special challenges faced by mentally ill inmates
and the difficulties this population poses for prison officials,
there is increasing interest on the part of both advocates and
policy-makers in ensuring that this population receives
appropriate treatment. Thus, external oversight is seen as
especially necessary for this segment of the prison population.
II. Organization of the Annotated Bibliography
We begin this literature review by highlighting sources
that provide a general overview of the correctional oversight
issue, including writings that speak to the importance and
need for independent oversight, articles that discuss the
meaning of this concept, and publications that provide
guidance on how to conduct monitoring activities. We then

972.

4. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat.
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turn to a focus on international oversight models, including
both trans-national oversight bodies and oversight mechanisms
that exist in specific countries. Also included are sources that
compare the correctional oversight mechanisms in various
countries.
Next, we identify resources about correctional oversight in
the United States. Again, we begin with some general sources
that discuss the range of oversight models that exist
domestically; then we address the role that litigation has
traditionally played in protecting prisoners‘ rights. We go on to
offer resources that provide more detail about the prison and
jail oversight bodies that exist in specific states and the federal
system.
Finally, we identify literature that discusses the potential
for oversight of specific correctional issues, such as private
prisons, sexual assault, and mental health and disability
issues. We also offer a variety of sources on police oversight.
Again, this Annotated Bibliography is not comprehensive,
but it provides a helpful starting place for research in any of
these areas. We should also note that the Pace Law Review
volume in which this article appears constitutes a virtual
sourcebook of information on prison oversight and has some of
the most relevant articles available on this subject. Most of the
articles in this volume are not discussed separately in this
Bibliography, but nevertheless deserve special attention by any
reader studying the oversight field.
III. Conclusion
While the literature discussing prison oversight is not
nearly as extensive as it should be, a number of valuable
resources still exist. This literature review is designed to
organize this body of work in a manner that will be valuable to
both practitioners and scholars. Holding prisons accountable
to the standards of human rights is a complicated enterprise,
but also an indispensable one. Oversight is a critical issue that
affects both human rights concerns and correctional
management and operations. The organizations, nations, and
states described in the literature annotated here offer
standards, mechanisms, and insights that, we hope, will
provide a meaningful perspective on how prison oversight can
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be developed and practiced effectively, and how it can help lead
to the more humane operation of prisons.

I. General Information about Correctional
Oversight
A. Overview of Oversight Models and Issues
American Bar Association (2008).
Resolution 104B:
Prison oversight and monitoring of juvenile and
adult facilities. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/am08104b.p
df
Official ABA policy now urges federal, state, local, and
tribal governments to develop and support independent
oversight mechanisms for all places of detention in that
jurisdiction. This resolution and the accompanying
report include detailed recommendations to ensure that
such oversight bodies are effective. These documents
provide an excellent starting place for any jurisdiction
considering the development of a correctional oversight
body.
American Bar Association (2010).
Criminal Justice
Standards (3rd Ed.).
Treatment of Prisoners.
Retrieved
on
April
26,
2010,
from
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/midyear201
0/102i.pdf
The ABA‘s Standards on prisoners‘ rights, recently
revised for the first time in 30 years, include important
provisions relevant to correctional oversight. Part XI of
the Standards (Standards 23-11.1–23-11.5), entitled
―Accountability and Oversight,‖ include provisions on
the topics of internal accountability, external regulation
and investigation, external monitoring and inspection,
legislative oversight and accountability, and media
access to correctional facilities and prisoners. While
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these standards are not binding on any jurisdiction,
they
provide
important
guidance
to
judges,
practitioners, advocates, and policy-makers, and
represent the best thinking of a range of criminal justice
and corrections experts and legal scholars from a wide
variety of perspectives.
Deitch, M. (2006). Opening Up a Closed World: What
Constitutes Effective Prison Oversight? Conference
Proceedings. Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public
Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin.
Retrieved
on
February
12,
2010,
from
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/prisonconference/.
This website contains the proceedings of the
international conference on prison oversight held at the
University of Texas in 2006. This was an invitationonly event that brought together 115 of the world‘s
leading experts, including prison officials, attorneys,
human rights advocates, representatives of all the major
correctional oversight bodies, scholars, judges, and
policy-makers.
Available online are videos of all
conference sessions held over two days, including both
panel discussions and keynote speeches; summaries of
all presentations made at the conference; a copy of the
conference agenda; a list of speakers and participants;
and copies of handouts describing various models of
correctional oversight. This is the most comprehensive
source available for anyone researching the topic of
prison oversight.
Deitch, M. (2006, February 8). Effective Prison
Oversight. Written Testimony Submitted to the
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s
Prisons – 4th Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010,
from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/
statements/deitch_michele.pdf.
Michele Deitch provides an overview of the prison
oversight issue, discussing in depth the distinctions
among different types of monitoring functions with a
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primary focus on the value of the inspection and
monitoring function and what it provides above and
beyond other types of oversight. She offers examples of
the range of correctional oversight bodies that exist both
internationally and in the United States, and details the
essential elements of an effective prison monitoring
system. She also highlights the benefits of external
monitoring for corrections officials.
Deitch, M. (2010). Distinguishing the Various Functions
of Effective Prison Oversight.
30 Pace Law
Review 1438 (2010). www.law.pace.edu/plr
This short piece provides an analytic framework for
thinking about prison oversight. Noting that the term
―oversight‖ lacks a clear meaning and that the different
functions of prison oversight are often confused and
seen as in competition with each other, the author
distinguishes several important functions provided by
oversight mechanisms, including regulation, audit,
accreditation, investigation, legal, reporting, and
monitoring. Each of these is a distinct element of
effective prison oversight, but all these functions need
not be served by the same oversight body. ―Oversight‖
is really an umbrella concept that encompasses each of
these functions, and the focus of reformers should be on
ensuring that each function is served effectively in every
jurisdiction. The ideal is to have a layered system of
correctional oversight in which there is a range of
effective internal accountability measures and robust
external oversight mechanisms.
Deitch, M. (2010).
Special Populations and the
Importance of Prison Oversight. 37 (3) American
Journal of Criminal Law __ (Summer 2010).
This article discusses the critical need for the
development of effective, independent oversight
mechanisms to ensure that prisons and jails become
more transparent in their operations and more
accountable for the protection of the rights of prisoners.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/20

10

2010]

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1697

The author argues that the need is especially great
when it comes to the protection of vulnerable prisoners,
including inmates housed in segregation, those at
greatest risk for sexual assault, prisoners who are
mentally ill or physically disabled, and prisoners with
serious medical needs. The article highlights examples
of independent oversight entities that can serve as
models, and identifies the essential elements of effective
prison oversight. The piece is based on the author‘s
invited testimony to the National Prison Rape
Elimination Commission.
Dickey, W. (2006, February 8). The Management of
Prisons in a Democratic Society.
Written
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/dick
ey_walter.pdf.
The central theme of this paper is that prisons should
be run in a manner consistent with the values of a
democratic society. As such, the public should have
access to prison rules, the legislature should conduct
oversight of prison rule-making and administration, and
prisons should be as transparent and visible as possible.
B. Monitoring Techniques
Association of Members of Independent Monitoring
Boards. (2005). Practical guide to monitoring
prisons. (3rd ed.).
Produced for members of U.K. prison monitoring boards,
this guide lists over 900 questions for monitors to use
when examining prison conditions. Sections are crossreferenced and include: reception and introduction
(intake), regime, food and prison environment, health,
safer custody, religion, race relations, applications and
complaints, special categories (juveniles, women,
elderly), security, order and control, resettlement
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(release), management, and independent monitoring
boards. The book notes that while some questions are
direct, others are more open-ended and thus allow for
monitors to exercise their own judgment depending on
the context of the situation.
Association for the Prevention of Torture; OSCE. Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
(2007). Monitoring Places of Detention: A Practical
Guide. Switzerland. Retrieved on February 9,
2010,
from
http://www.apt.ch/component/
option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,57/Itemid,59
/lang,en/.
This updated manual provides technical guidance for
NGOs and other bodies entitled to conduct monitoring
visits to places of detention. It defends the importance
of maintaining NGO monitoring groups as an
independent and more permanent complement to
national and international monitoring mechanisms.
The manual also includes a section on specific
conditions that should be examined, and the applicable
international standards.
Coyle, A. (2002). Human Rights Approach to Prison
Management: A Handbook for Prison Staff.
International
Centre
for
Prison
Studies.
Retrieved
on
February
9,
2010,
from
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/dow
nloads/handbook_2nd_ed_eng_8.pdf.
This all-inclusive handbook is an important resource for
prison staff who wish to implement various
international human rights standards in their practical
day-to-day work. Among the various topics covered, the
handbook stresses the importance of inspections. Before
delving into a variety of inspection procedures, author
Andrew Coyle, a former prison administrator, explains
the value of these processes. Inspections are divided
into informal and formal mechanisms that can take the
shape of something as simple as regular contact

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss5/20

12

2010]

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1699

between the prison and community agencies, to much
more formalized monitoring bodies.
The manual
explains that administrative inspections that audit
procedures, though important, are not sufficient to
protect human rights. Independent inspections are the
best method and the author argues that the most
independent of these oversight bodies involve inspectors
who are appointed by legislatures and report back to
them. The section on inspections closes with a section
entitled ―Putting it into Practice,‖ which helps translate
these standards into practical procedures for
correctional staff.
Coyle, A. (2003).
Humanity in prison.
International Centre for Prison Studies.

London:

Andrew Coyle provides a draft audit instrument as a
mechanism for ensuring humane treatment in prisons.
It is intended for broad use either by prison
administrators or by independent investigators. The
audit instrument uses an exhaustive questionnaire
addressing virtually all facets of prison life and
administration and it relies primarily on qualitative
measures.
Nowicki, M., & Fialova, Z. (2001). Human rights
monitoring. Warszawa: Helsinki Foundation for
Human Rights. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/pliki/Monitoring_eng.p
df
A training manual designed for NGO watchdog
organizations, this handbook provides extensive,
detailed guidance on developing and conducting
monitoring visits, and methods for reporting results of
human rights inspections. It was developed based on
the experiences of Polish NGOs, state inspectors, and
intergovernmental groups such as the CPT, and it
incorporated feedback from trainees. The handbook
provides information on the purposes of monitoring,
technical assistance in developing strategies, creating a
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team, conducting monitoring visits, investigating data,
collecting evidence, and distributing the report.
Penal Reform International. (2001). Making Standards
Work: An International Handbook on Good Prison
Practice.
2nd Ed. London:
Astron Printers.
Retrieved
on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.penalreform.org/files/man-2001making-standards-work-en.pdf
This publication advocates an integrated approach to
prison inspection, recommending internal and external,
official and unofficial, national, regional, and universal
mechanisms for oversight. Throughout, the authors
emphasize the need for independence. They recommend
that outside entities that specialize in specific areas
perform inspections consistent with their particular
expertise.
The volume also advocates a dynamic
inspection process so as to prevent co-optation of
inspectors by the prison environment.
All
recommendations are grounded in the United Nations‘
Standard Minimum Rules (SMR).
II. International Oversight Models
A. Trans-National Models
1. International Committee of the Red Cross
Aeschlimann, A. (2005). Protection of detainees: ICRC
action behind bars. International Review of the
Red Cross, 87, 83-122. Retrieved May 20, 2010,
from
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
htmlall/review-857-p83/$File/irrc_857_
Aeschelimann.pdf
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
outlines its procedures for investigating the treatment
of detainees. The document emphasizes the flexibility
in standards and procedures that is contingent upon the
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context of the investigation. For instance, the facility at
Guantanamo Bay is likely to be approached differently
than an aged prison in a developing country. Inspectors
meet with both prisoners and staff, taking special care
to educate the latter on international standards and
legal matters, as well as on steps that can be taken
toward improving conditions. The ICRC is also careful
to use the same representatives for regular
investigations of any one location to facilitate an
ongoing dialogue with the institution and its detainees.
The resulting dialogue from inspections remains
confidential between the ICRC and administrators in
the interest of building trust.
International Committee of the Red Cross.
(2004,
February 7). ICRC visits to persons deprived of
their freedom: An internationally mandated task,
implemented worldwide. Retrieved May 20, 2010,
from
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/
siteeng0.nsf/iwpList265/4C2DE1E5ED3C7C9DC125
6B660061123E
The ICRC briefly describes its rationale and
methodology for visiting detainees.
The standard
procedures include the registration of prisoners, an
overview of all facilities, private talks with detainees,
and delivery of written messages to their families. Any
problems are only taken to authorities with the express
permission of the detainee. Reports are given directly to
detaining authorities and are not intended for
publication.
2. United Nations
Centre for Human Rights, & Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Branch. (1994). Supervision of
places of detention. In Human rights and pre-trial
detention: A handbook of international standards
relating to pre-trial detention (pp. 35-37).
Professional training series no. 3. New York:
United Nations.

15

1702

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:5

Of particular interest in this manual is the standard
dealing with ―Supervision of Places of Detention,‖ which
asserts that ―effective supervision of places of detention
by impartial authorities interested in maintaining
humane treatment is vital for the protection of human
rights of detainees.‖
The manual lists relevant
international standards pertaining to issues such as the
ability of prisoners to make confidential complaints and
the authorities‘ ability to investigate unnatural deaths.
The manual provides an interpretation of these
international standards and offers practical guidelines
for administering them.
Committee Against Torture. (n.d.).
Monitoring the
prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Retrieved
May 20, 2010, from http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/cat/index.htm
This webpage includes a brief description and detailed
links associated with the work of the U.N. Committee
against Torture (CAT). The group comprises a body of
independent experts that monitor the implementation of
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by
state parties. All countries are required to submit
reports to the committee to describe how rights are
being implemented. CAT also can consider individual
complaints, undertake inquiries, and consider intercountry complaints.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
(2001). Visits to persons in detention. In Training
manual on human rights monitoring (pp. 127-147).
Professional training series no. 7. New York:
United Nations.
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While the entire manual provides useful advice on
conducting monitoring, the chapter ―Visits to Persons in
Detention‖ provides detailed information on standards
applicable to detention issues and special populations.
It also offers guidance on conducting both global
monitoring (visits to an entire detention facility) and
focused monitoring (more specific inquiries related to a
particular issue or person). The guidance provided is
comprehensive and covers pre-visit issues (such as
setting objectives and selecting sites), monitoring issues
(such as interviewing detainees), and follow-up and
reporting guidance.
The chapter stresses the
importance of coordinating with the International
Committee of the Red Cross.
3. Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT)
Casale, S. (2006). Mechanisms for Custodial Oversight:
The United States and Europe. 22 Washington
University Journal of Law and Policy 217.
Retrieved
on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://law.wustl.edu/Journal/22/p217Casale.pdf
Dr. Silvia Casale, the then-President of the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT),
provides a detailed description of the structure and
function of the CPT correctional oversight mechanism in
place throughout Europe. Of particular importance to
the CPT‘s work is its independence, access to all places
of detention, impartiality, expertise, maintenance of
confidentiality, and ability to work collaboratively with
prison officials. The CPT does not have enforcement
authority, so it relies on the power of persuasion. The
work of the CPT is forward-looking, seeking to prevent
human rights violations rather than to investigate past
misconduct.
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Council of Europe Committee of Ministers.
(2006).
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to
member states on the European Prison Rules.
Retrieved
May
20,
2010,
from
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Rec(2006)2&S
ector=secCM&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=origina
l&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntrane
t=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75
This document urges countries that are members of the
Council of Europe to abide by the European Prison
Rules, which are attached as an Appendix to the
document. The European Prison Rules provide an
exhaustive set of standards designed to ensure prison
safety, security, and discipline while not undermining
prisoners‘ individual dignity and rehabilitation. The
standards outline basic principles of human rights and
inspections, and provide detailed guidance on issues
such as conditions of imprisonment, health, good order,
safety, discipline, and use of force. Moreover, the
European Prison Rules mandate that prisons be
inspected regularly by a government body to ensure
compliance with the rules, and that there be monitoring
by an independent body to assess the treatment of
prisoners.
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
(2004). The CPT standards: “Substantive” sections
of the CPT’s general reports. Retrieved May 20,
2010,
from
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/
documents/eng-standards-scr.pdf
This document briefly describes the standards that
guide the CPT‘s periodic and ad-hoc prison inspections.
These
standards
include
provisions
regarding
overcrowding, recreation, disciplinary procedures,
health care, the treatment of foreign nationals, women,
and juveniles, and criteria for the placement of inmates
in psychiatric facilities. The report is intended to
provide authorities with clear guidance as to how
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prisoners and other persons deprived of their liberty
should be treated and to stimulate discussion about
these issues.
Kellberg, L. (2001). The European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. In G. Alfredsson, J.
Grimheden, B. G. Ramcharan, & A. de Zayas
(Eds.), International human rights monitoring
mechanisms: Essays in honour of Jakob Th. Möller
(Vol. 7, pp. 587-599). The Raoul Wallenberg
Institute Human Rights Library. The Hague, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
This article describes the creation, composition, powers,
and duties of the CPT. The committee aims to prevent
ill-treatment by initiating periodic, ad hoc, and followup visits to public and private places of detention in
participating countries. Committee members gather
information by examining the physical conditions of
confinement, and speaking to staff, detainees,
government authorities, and other interested parties,
such as families and NGOs. The author notes the
importance of the CPT‘s non-confrontational role, as
evidenced by its promise of confidentiality and role as a
provider of assistance to detention officials. Specifically,
the CPT attempts to resolve concerns it identifies
directly with government authorities, and reports can
only be released by those authorities (the CPT
encourages them to release these reports).
Morgan, R., & Evans, M. (2001). Combating torture in
Europe. Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe
Publishing.
In this important book, Morgan and Evans outline the
history, procedures, and standards of the CPT. The
CPT has unlimited access to correctional facilities
located in countries belonging to the Council of Europe,
and it conducts periodic and ad hoc visits to detention
facilities throughout these countries. CPT inspectors
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are in constant dialogue with the prison administration
through every phase of the inspection. Reports of visits
are released only to government authorities, and
officials there decide whether to release the report
publicly. Follow-up visits are expected and initial
inspections are always understood to be part of a larger
process. The book also outlines the CPT‘s standards
with regard to what constitutes torture and inhumane
and degrading treatment, different categories of
detainees, and safety and health standards for
prisoners. The book closes with an assessment of the
CPT‘s achievements to date and what lies ahead as the
Council of Europe grows in importance and
membership.
Africa‘s Special Rapporteur on Prisons Vilijoen, F.
(2005). The Special Rapporteur on Prisons and
Conditions of Detention in Africa: Achievements
and possibilities. 27 Human Rights Quarterly 12571 (2005).
The article extensively reviews the creation, activities,
strengths, and weaknesses of the Special Rapporteur on
Prisons (SRP), a position established by the African
Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights. The SRP
examines the situation of persons deprived of their
liberty within the countries that are party to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights (131). The
SRP‘s four main activities include: investigating and
reporting through country visits (the SRP must be
invited by the country‘s government); conducting urgent
interventions; assisting the Commission with related
communications; and promoting prisoners‘ rights and
international standards. Vilijoen notes that, although
the SRP overlaps with some international monitoring
groups, the agency should be seen as complementing
these groups by providing focused attention on detainee
rights, and increased follow-up. The author concludes
that visits and reporting have been well-conducted, but
there is little guidance on handling urgent appeals. He
also notes that the promotion of prisoners‘ issues has
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increased awareness among prison officials but not in
other quarters, and the African Commission has not
requested SRP consultation on issues related to
detention.
Finally,
Vilijoen
makes
seven
recommendations, including some that address SRP‘s
dependence on the NGO Penal Reform International,
and the lack of prison monitoring in Northern Africa
and more populous countries.
B. National Models (Non-U.S.)
1. Australia
Groves, M. (2002). Ombudsmen‘s Jurisdiction in Prisons.
28 Monash University Law Review 181-205 (2002).
This article explores the role of Australian ombudsmen
in that country‘s administrative system, with a
particular emphasis on their work within the prison
context.
Groves explains that ombudsmen are
independent of the executive, can initiate investigations
in response to complaints or of their own accord, and
although lacking determinative powers (the ability to
order a particular action), are still able to exert
considerable influence on officials to review and
reconsider decisions. Groves notes that ombudsmen
have a right to visit prisoners, that they regularly go to
prisons to promote awareness of their position and role,
and that, other than in the state of Tasmania, prisoners
have an unfettered right to communicate with
ombudsmen.
Groves concludes that the current
structure has worked well and argues against granting
determinative power to ombudsmen for the fear that
such power might undermine their status as neutral,
disinterested observers.
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Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services of Western
Australia. Annual Report 2008-09. Retrieved on
February
7,
2010,
from
http://www.custodialinspector.wa.gov.au/
The Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services is a
government office that brings independent and external
oversight to prisons in Western Australia.
This
structure is unique in Australia, as it is the only such
oversight agency that is independent and capable of
direct access to parliament. The office is based on the
British Prison Inspectorate model, and it is required to
inspect every correctional facility at least once every
three years. Most of its inspections are announced a few
months in advance.
Sands, V. (2004, December). Regulatory independence,
public accountability and the Victorian prison
system. 63 (4) Australian Journal of Public
Administration 50-59 (2004).
This article examines how the move towards
privatization of public services has affected independent
monitoring and review of Victoria‘s prisons. It begins by
examining the old models of public accountability in
government generally and then concludes that they are
no longer workable under the new public management
(NPM) principles in place today.
Specifically,
regulations are probed to determine if there has been
any loss of independence to the oversight mechanisms
that were in place under the old regulatory scheme.
After detailing the changes that took place in 1992 and
again in 2003 with the restructuring for a ―more
seamless system,‖ the author concludes that the current
correctional oversight mechanism has suffered a loss of
independence.
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2. Canada
Correctional Service of Canada. (1997, December).
Human rights and corrections: A strategic model.
Retrieved May 20, 2010, from http://www.cscscc.gc.ca/text/pblct/rights/human/toce-eng.shtml
In this report, Canada‘s Working Group on Human
Rights reviews the Correctional Service of Canada‘s
(CSC) current systems for ensuring human rights in a
corrections context, creates a model for evaluating the
agency‘s compliance with human rights standards, and
makes recommendations regarding CSC‘s ability to
achieve compliance and communicate their results.
Notably, the Working Group focuses on the human
rights of prisoners, staff, and special populations
(women and indigenous groups). Interestingly, the
group also considers both domestic and international
legal obligations, including international human rights
treaties and instruments approved by the Canadian
Government. Chapter three of the report compares
Canada to similar countries and finds that most of these
countries provide for both internal prison grievance
systems
and
external
correctional
monitoring
mechanisms.
Jackson, M. (2006). The litmus test of legitimacy:
Independent adjudication and administrative
segregation. 48 Canadian Journal of Criminology
157 (2006).
In this article, Professor Michael Jackson discusses the
potential for the use of ―independent adjudication‖ (the
use of decision-makers external to the agency) to review
the decision to place and retain a prisoner in
administrative segregation in Canada. He argues that
the severity and indefinite duration of administrative
segregation requires additional measures to ensure that
human rights standards are met. The controversy
surrounding the use of independent adjudicators has
been examined and debated by numerous government
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working groups over the past twenty-five years and the
author chronologically describes these previous groups‘
conclusions and their consistent recommendations for
the use of independent adjudicators in this context.
Jackson also describes competing arguments made by
the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) in response to
these recommendations. Despite repeated efforts on the
part of advocates to respond to concerns of the CSC and
the development of a pilot project, the CSC has
continued to resist implementation of the proposals, and
Jackson concludes that CSC is reluctant to have
independent adjudication of administrative segregation
because it would subject decisions about prisoners‘
rights to outside involvement. Jackson reinforces the
need for independent adjudication to ensure fair
hearings, protection of prisoners, and the creation of reintegration plans. He further adds that judicial or
Parliamentary intervention may be needed to counter
the CSC‘s continued resistance to independent
adjudication.
Office of the Correctional Investigator. (2002, December
20). Mandate, roles and responsibilities. Retrieved
May 20, 2010, from http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/maneng.aspx
The Office of the Correctional Investigator is a
legislatively-mandated ombudsman for prisoners. The
Office investigates prisoner complaints, meets with
inmate committees, conducts unannounced visits to
penitentiaries, reviews applicable Correctional Service
of Canada policies and procedures, and issues annual
reports to the legislature highlighting issues of concern.
The Office has significant authority to require the
production of information during an investigation, but
maintains integrity by imposing strict requirements to
ensure requests for information are pertinent and follow
privacy laws.
In addition, the Office cannot be
summoned in legal proceedings and its processes are
independent of appeals before the courts, which ensures
the Office‘s actions are not compromised by advocates‘
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efforts to use the office as a substitute for discovery
mechanisms or procedural prerequisites.
Sloan, T. (2004, June). Shifting the orbit: Human rights,
independent review and accountability in the
Canadian corrections system. Office of the
Correctional Investigator. Retrieved February 8,
2010, from http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/rpt/pdf/disc/
disc20040629-eng.pdf
This discussion paper forcefully argues for independent
adjudication of certain decisions made by the
Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). The author
highlights various developments that have had an
impact on the debate regarding the need for external,
independent adjudication for CSC. The paper asserts
that CSC has allowed citizen involvement in prison
oversight, but has rejected the notion of independent
review of grievances or decisions to place an inmate in
administrative segregation. The paper discusses issues
pertaining to the rights of aboriginal offenders and
makes
recommendations
regarding
independent
adjudication.
Also, the author summarizes several perspectives
regarding independent oversight, such as political and
managerial accountability, sufficiency of current
oversight, balancing of interests, importance of safety
and security, and correctional expertise. Perhaps most
interesting for researchers canvassing the debate on
independent adjudication is the last section of the
paper—―Issues and Options‖—which considers such
issues as how to weigh offender rights against safety
and security, and whether allowing CSC to pass difficult
decisions to outside adjudicators will impact the
agency‘s accountability and control over prisoners.
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Trevethan, S., Rastin, C. J., Bell, A., & Gillis, C. (2004,
June). Citizens’ Advisory Committees in Canada: A
research report (R. No. 147). Correctional Service
of Canada, Research Branch. Retrieved May 20,
2010,
from
http://www.cscscc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/r147/r147-eng.shtml
This report describes the mission of Citizens‘ Advisory
Committees (CAC) in Canada and evaluates differences
in CACs, activities, member concerns, and effectiveness.
The authors also interviewed CAC members to establish
a profile of those who serve on the committees. CAC‘s
were established in the 1960s, and consist of community
volunteers from an area where a penitentiary or
Community Correctional Centre is located. Members
are appointed by prison wardens or parole office
directors, and the CACs participate in a number of
activities. The author notes that CAC members fulfill
three main roles: liaison, observer, and advisor. Finally,
the authors note that while most members feel satisfied
with their work, concerns remain about a lack of
information regarding correctional staff, victims, and
crisis policies. Other concerns about the CACs include
communication, recruitment of members, community
involvement, and funding.
Zinger, I. (2006). Human Rights Compliance and the
Role of External Prison Oversight. 48 Canadian
Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 127
(April 2006). See also the rest of this special
volume.
This paper is an introduction to a special volume of the
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice
devoted to issues related to prison oversight in Canada.
The author notes the ongoing challenges, even in
advanced democracies, of ensuring legal standards of
humane detention, and observes that adherence to
human rights standards is actually the most effective
correctional management tool that exists. The author
reflects on the value of external prison oversight in
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fostering compliance with these human rights
requirements. He argues the need for both effective
internal accountability measures and external scrutiny,
and discusses the challenges in striking the correct
balance between these two important types of oversight.
Praising the various oversight bodies that exist in
Canada, the author posits that Canada can play an
international leadership role when it comes to the
humane treatment of prisoners.
3. Denmark
Eklundh, C. (2002). The Independence of the
Ombudsman. In The work and practice of
Ombudsman
and
national
human
rights
institutions (pp. 13-16). Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
Eklundh reviews the importance of maintaining the
integrity and independence of the ombudsman position.
The author stresses that the ombudsman must be
independent of the executive and judiciary. While this
tends to mean the ombudsman is accountable to the
legislature, the author further notes the importance of
maintaining a balance between the two parties.
Methods of accomplishing this include: protecting the
ombudsman‘s tenure and budget and insulating the
direction of his work from legislative interference.
4. Ireland
Rogan,
M.
(2009).
Visiting
Committees
and
Accountability in the Irish Prison System: Some
Proposals for Reform. 31 Dublin University Law
Journal 208 (2009).
This article discusses Ireland‘s use
Committees‖ to monitor conditions in
facility. These committees, comprised
citizens, conduct regular inspections
complaints from prisoners. The Visiting

of ―Visiting
each prison
by appointed
and receive
Committee of
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each facility publishes an annual report that is
presented to the Minister of Justice. The author
identifies shortcomings in the work of the Visiting
Committees and notes that its independence from the
prison authorities is subject to debate. She criticizes
Ireland‘s lack of an Ombudsman to serve as an
independent complaints mechanism for prisoners
similar to what Great Britain has, as well as the
absence of a statutory body to investigate deaths while
in custody. She further notes that while Ireland has an
Office of the Inspector of Prisons, that office is charged
only with handling systemic investigations rather than
addressing individual concerns. She offers a variety of
proposals for enhancing accountability in the Irish
prison system.
5. Latin America
Ungar, M. (2003). Prisons and politics in contemporary
Latin America. 25 Human Rights Quarterly 909-34
(2003).
Ungar reviews the current state of Latin American
prisons, including human rights abuses, attempts at
reform, and political and administrative obstacles in the
way of such reform efforts.
He maintains that
overcrowding, lack of funding, delayed detainee
processing, and political manipulation of crime issues
contribute to a systematic failure in protecting
prisoners‘ human rights.
In addressing reform
measures, he mentions reducing overcrowding through
conditional release and alternative sentencing,
strengthening legal defense agencies, privatization, and
altering penal process codes. Of particular interest is
the author‘s description of the Defensoría del Pueblo, an
independent national ombudsman‘s office that has been
created in eleven different Latin America states. Ungar
explains that the Defensorías investigate human rights
abuses, take citizen complaints, initiate legal action,
and formulate policy. He notes that while they have no
specific power in the penal process, they have been
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successful in exposing inadequate prison conditions in
certain states.
6. New Zealand
Belgrave, J. ―The Ombudsmen in the Prisons—The New
Zealand Experience.‖ Address to the 2nd
Australasian
Conference
for
Correctional
Inspectors, 2006. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from
http://www.custodialinspector.wa.gov.au/go/publi
cations-and-resources/conference-papers
This PowerPoint presentation at a conference of prison
monitors in Australia and New Zealand provides an
overview of the work of the New Zealand Ombudsman.
While the Ombudsman‘s office has responsibility for
complaints from all government agencies, the office
contains four specialist investigators who work on
prison-related issues and visit each prison facility about
nine times per year.
The office handles minor
complaints, and also monitors the prison agency‘s
investigations of serious incidents and deaths in
custody. Importantly, the Ombudsman also has the
power to investigate systemic issues and the paper
describes various examples of the kinds of major issues
that have been investigated. The Ombudsman reports
directly to Parliament.
7. Poland
Walmsley, R. (1996). ―Inspection‖ and ―Relations with
non-governmental organizations‖. In Prison
Systems in Central and Eastern Europe: Progress,
problems, and the international standards (pp.
318-319). Publication series no. 29. Helsinki,
Finland: European Institute for Crime Prevention
and Control, affiliated with the United Nations.
These sections of the larger publication describe the
work of the Polish prison service and, in particular, the
inspection department charged with visiting regional
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prisons, and emphasizes the importance of interviewing
inmates to determine the atmosphere of the prison. To
accommodate the difficulty in changing prison
environments, the inspection department gives
governors time limits for the implementation of each
recommendation, and sends follow-up teams to ensure
changes are implemented. In ―Relations with nongovernmental organizations,‖ the author notes that the
inspection department uses strong relationships with
the Helsinki Committee, the Ombudsman‘s Office, and
NGOs responsible for ex-offender reentry to identify
issues of concern.
8. Sweden
Swedish
Parliamentary
Ombudsman,
http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?Language=en (also see
Nordenfelt, C. (2006). ―The Swedish Parliamentary
Ombudsman.‖ Handout from the conference
―Opening Up a Closed World: What Constitutes
Effective Prison Oversight?‖).
This website describes the operations of the
Parliamentary Ombudsman, an office with a Chief and
three Deputy Ombudsmen, including one dedicated to
prison-related matters. The Ombudsmen are elected by
the Swedish Parliament to ensure that public
authorities and their staff comply with the laws and
human rights standards.
The Ombudsmen have
significant powers to address deficiencies, including the
ability to act as a special prosecutor in extreme cases.
9. South Africa
Civil

Society
Prison
Reform
Initiative
(2009).
Roundtable discussion on oversight over the prison
system.
Retrieved
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clcprojects/civil-society-prison-reform-initiative/
publications-1/cspri-publications/Oversight%2
0over %20prison%20system.pdf/
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This report of a roundtable discussion about prison
oversight in South Africa outlines the responsibilities of
various oversight bodies, including a Parliamentary
committee on correctional services, the Judicial
Inspectorate for Prisons, the South African Human
Rights Commission, NGOs, and the media. Discussion
focused on the priorities and challenges faced by of each
entity and the interaction among the oversight bodies.
The outcome of the meeting was an identification of key
correctional issues in need of reform and a commitment
to working more collaboratively to ensuring more
accountability in the performance of the prison agency.
Dissel, A. (2003, November). A review of civilian
oversight over correctional services in the last
decade. South Africa: Civil Society Prison Reform
Initiative. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clcprojects/civil-society-prison-reforminitiative/publications-1/cspri-publications/
Oversight_corrections_No_4.pdf/
Ten years after South Africa‘s governmental transition,
which included the creation of civilian oversight
mechanisms
to
enhance
accountability
and
transparency of public institutions, this review set out
to evaluate how well the correctional oversight
mechanisms were functioning.
The paper outlines
several of the oversight mechanisms with responsibility
for prisons, and makes recommendations for
strengthening their impact.
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Gallinetti, J. (2004, May). Report on the Evaluation of the
Independent Prison Visitors System (IPV). South
Africa: Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative.
Retrieved
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clcprojects/civil-society-prison-reforminitiative/publications-1/cspri-submissions-andpresentations/040811ipvreport%20csc%20jacque%
20may%202004.pdf/?searchterm=Gallinetti
This report is part of an overall review of civilian
correctional oversight mechanisms in South Africa with
a focus on the Independent Prison Visitors System
(IPV). Independent Prison Visitors are appointed by the
Inspecting Judge to deal with prisoner complaints and
provide a mechanism that allows for community
involvement in the prison system. The report evaluates
almost every aspect of the IPV, including its functions,
duties, and powers. Additionally, the report assesses
the IPV‘s relationship with the Judicial Inspectorate of
Prisons in South Africa, another oversight body, and
with correctional department staff. The research was
not intended to evaluate individual IPVs but rather to
evaluate the system more generally.
The report
describes the IPV system as an ―overwhelming success,‖
though it offers several recommendations for enhancing
its effectiveness.
Jagwanth, S. (2004, May). A Review of the Judicial
Inspectorate of Prisons of South Africa. South
Africa: Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative.
Retrieved
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clcprojects/civil-society-prison-reforminitiative/publications-1/cspripublications/Judicial_Inspectorate_Report_No_7.
pdf/
As part of a large comprehensive review of the
correctional oversight mechanisms in place in South
African, academics from the CSPRI developed this
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report with a focus on the Judicial Inspectorate of
Prisons, one of the key oversight structures in place to
address concerns about the human rights of prisoners.
While the oversight mechanism is seen as important
and as having contributed to correctional reforms, the
report also details some concerns about the effectiveness
of the oversight structure.
The author provides
information about oversight structures in other
countries and the report ends with a series of
recommendations.
10. United Kingdom
HM

Inspectorate of Prisons (2009). Expectations:
Criteria for assessing the conditions in prison and
the treatment of prisoners (3rd ed.). Retrieved on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.justice.gov.uk/inspectorates/hmiprisons/docs/expectations_2009.pdf
This document sets forth the criteria used by the British
Inspector of Prisons to evaluate prison conditions during
inspections. The criteria draw on international human
rights standards and they adopt a holistic approach to
assessing prison conditions and determining whether a
prison is ―healthy.‖ The Inspectorate uses four tests to
assess the health of a custodial environment: (1) that
prisoners are held in safety; (2) that they are treated
with respect as humans; (3) that prisoners engage in
purposeful activity; and (4) that they are prepared for a
return to the community. These criteria provide the
basis for robust, independent, and evidence-based
assessment of prison conditions and the treatment of
prisoners.

Independent Monitoring Boards. Retrieved on May 20,
2010, from http://www.imb.gov.uk/
Independent Monitoring Boards (―IMBs,‖ formerly
known as Boards of Visitors) are one of the three forms
of external review of prison conditions in England and
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Wales. IMBs consist of lay citizens who volunteer on an
unpaid basis to monitor local prisons on a day-to-day
basis and members of the IMB are appointed by the
British Home Secretary. Each prison has its own IMB.
After receiving training, these citizen volunteers have
unfettered access to the prison, make routine
inspections, interview prisoners to ensure that prison
conditions are being maintained at an adequate level,
and handle prisoner complaints. The position is open to
any citizen who chooses to apply and is approved after
an interview, and the IMBs are intended to be
representative of the community. Each IMB issues an
annual report about the prison it monitors.
Mordaunt, E.
(2000).
―The Emergence of MultiInspectorate Inspections: ‗Going it Alone is not
an Option.‖ 78
Public Administration 751-69
(2000).
Based on a comparative study of four British
inspectorates, Mordaunt develops a typology for prison
inspections (single institutional inspections, multiservice inspections, thematic inspections, survey
inspections, monitoring reviews).
He then focuses
specifically on the multi-inspectorate approach,
describing it as a current development that is likely to
have a significant impact on oversight practices.
Mordaunt describes two specific multi-inspectorate
models. The first include Joint Reviews that explore
quality, effectiveness, and financial efficiency. The
second example is the joint inspection between the HM
Inspectorate of Prisons and the HM Inspectorate of
Parole. The article closes with a number of issues that
Mordaunt argues must be taken into consideration
before such approaches can be effective.
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Owers, A. (Feb. 9th, 2006). ―Submission to Vera
Commission.‖ 22 Washington University Journal
of Law & Policy 231 (2006). Retrieved on May 20,
2010
from:
http://law.wustl.edu/Journal/22/p231Owers.pdf
This article provides the most useful and readily
available description of the structure of the British
Prison Inspectorate. As Her Majesty‘s Chief Inspector
of Prisons for England and Wales, Anne Owers
discusses the role of the inspectorate and the agency‘s
methodology, as well as the importance of independent
scrutiny in ensuring humane conditions and treatment
of prisoners. She views the Inspectorate‘s oversight role
as preventative in nature. Owers describes the schedule
and format of inspections and the reports the
Inspectorate issues, and assesses the influence the
Inspectorate has had.
She stresses that different
contexts require different systems and notes that this
particular model of oversight may not necessarily be
ideal for other countries, though the methods, tests, and
criteria the Inspectorate uses can surely be adapted by
others seeking to take on monitoring responsibilities.
Owers, A. (2004, December 9). Rights behind bars: The
conditions and treatment of those in prison.
Speech presented at The International Human
Rights Day Lecture, The Centre for the Study
Human Rights. Retrieved May 20, 2010, from
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/humanRights/arti
clesAndTranscripts/Rights_behind_bars.pdf
Anne Owers, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England
and Wales, delivers a speech that focuses on three main
themes: human rights in a prison context, the
importance of independent prison inspections as a
human rights mechanism, and reactions to proposed
restructured forms of public service inspectors. Owers
uses examples from her inspections to reveal how prison
environments are inherently dangerous to the fostering
of human rights. She then explains how independent
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inspectors impact human rights conditions in prisons
and places of detention and how their inspections differ
from internal reviews of efficiency or adherence to
standards. The speech outlines four principles for
inspections: (1) focusing their scale and scope on places
of detention, (2) empowering the Chief Inspector so that
he or she has the flexibility and resources to inspect any
prison at any time, (3) reporting directly to the Minister
and public, and (4) maintaining a distinction between
inspecting prison environments and the monitoring of
prison services. Owers then offers her perspective on
recent attempts to consolidate prison inspection
mechanisms with probation inspectorates and criminal
justice system inspectorates.
Owers, A. (2003, October 22). Prisons Inspection and the
Protection of Human Rights. Speech presented at
The British Institute of Human Rights Lunchtime
Lecture.
Retrieved
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.bihr.org.uk/documents/lunchtimelectures/prisons-inspection-and-the-protection-ofhuman-rights
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales,
Anne Owers, explains how prison inspections can help
monitor, prevent, and disclose human rights concerns.
She argues that the first two tests of the Prisons
Inspectorate ‗Healthy Prisons‘ concept—safety and
respect—constitute the bottom line of any custodial
environment. She differentiates between the types of
oversight provided by the citizen volunteers of the
Independent Monitoring Boards who visit prison
facilities on a daily basis and the detailed scrutiny
provided by specialists from the Inspectorate working
on-site for an entire week. Fearing changes to the
inspectorate system, the Chief Inspector concludes with
four elements that she believes are essential to an
effective inspectorate, including the use of independent
monitoring criteria; frequent inspections on a set
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schedule; the ability to conduct unannounced
inspections; and meaningful independence.
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England and
Wales. Website:
http://www.ppo.gov.uk/aboutus.html
This website describes the work of the Ombudsman‘s
office, which handles individual complaints from
prisoners, probationers, and immigrant detainees, and
also investigates deaths in custody. The Ombudsman is
one of the key oversight bodies in the UK, along with
the Prisons Inspectorate and the Independent
Monitoring Boards.
The website contains Annual
Reports and other official documents, as well as an
interesting protocol detailing the working arrangements
between the Ombudsman and the Inspectorate. The
latter
(available
at:
http://www.ppo.gov.uk/docs/protocol_working_arrrange
ments_between_hmcip_ppo.pdf) could be helpful for
oversight bodies in other jurisdictions seeking to
coordinate their oversight responsibilities with another
entity.
Ramsbotham, D. (2005). Prisongate: The Shocking State
of Britain’s Prisons and the Need for Visionary
Change, London: Free Press – Simon and
Schuster.
This book is an account of David Ramsbotham‘s tenure
as Chief Inspector of Prisons in the United Kingdom.
As he writes about his experiences in this office, he
introduces the reader to some of the difficulties
confronted, including bad prison conditions, a lack of
funding, and poor management. He also discusses his
perspective on his office‘s role, as well as the role of
prison oversight in general, noting that quality
assurance is one of the critical values that independent
inspection contributes to the conduct of imprisonment.
He laments the fact that prisons are not working as well
as they should, something he finds regrettable since

37

1724

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:5

most prisoners will be released from prison. He ends
with his recommendations on how to improve the
British penal system.
C. Country Comparisons
Casale, S., Chunn, G. C., & Dickey, W. (Feb. 8th, 2006).
Transparency in American Corrections Panel.
Transcript of Proceedings from Commssion on
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing.
Retrieved February 8, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/public_hearing_
4.asp
The panel discussed transparency in American prisons,
especially as compared to certain European countries
operating within the jurisdiction of the Committee for
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CPT). Panelists discussed
whether an approach similar to the CPT would be
effective or viable in the United States. They also
addressed how oversight is best initiated through
forming a partnership with penal institutions, as well as
emphasizing that successful oversight not only involves
criticism of bad practices, but also praise for positive
practices.
Deitch, M. (2005). Why You Should Love Watchdogs: The
Case for Effective Prison Oversight and the
British Experience. XVII (3) Correctional Law
Reporter, Oct./Nov., 40-42, 46-47.
Deitch begins with a discussion of the meaning of prison
oversight, emphasizing three key factors: (1) the
oversight body is external to the agency being reviewed;
(2) the focus of the oversight body is not on compliance
with rules and standards but rather on the treatment of
prisoners; and (3) the oversight is routine and designed
to prevent problems, rather than designed to investigate
problems after they have occurred. Although she notes
that such types of oversight are generally lacking in the
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current American system, Britain already has such a
correctional oversight system in place and Deitch
describes the British oversight structure. She also
highlights the benefits that such oversight provides for
corrections officials.
Hood, C., James, O., Peters, B.G., & Scott, C. (Eds.)
(2004). Controlling Modern Government: Variety,
Commonality and Change. Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar.
A significant portion of this book is devoted to
examining the prison systems in eight different
countries: Australia, France, Germany, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, England and Wales, and the
United States. The authors note that there has been
little growth in prison oversight in these nations since
the mid-1970s, despite the fact that the prison
population has exploded during this time. The book
provides a detailed analysis of the oversight
mechanisms present in each of these eight countries.
The section on the U.S. focuses primarily on the Federal
Bureau of Prisons rather than on state prison systems.
Maguire, M., Vagg, J., & Morgan, R. (Eds.). (1985).
Accountability and prisons: Opening up a closed
world. London: Tavistock Publications.
Although somewhat dated, this book provides an
impressive collection of essays exploring various
mechanisms for instituting prison oversight, including
the creation of standards, independent inspections,
ombudsmen, grievance procedures, and internal
management techniques. The last section compares
three countries‘ oversight mechanisms: the Netherlands‘
grievance procedures, Canada‘s disciplinary review
mechanisms, and the United States‘ judicial
intervention to address poor prison conditions.
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Mariner, J. (2002). Behind Bars in America. 29 (2)
Human Rights 9-10 (Spring 2002).
Mariner focuses on the lack of prison and jail oversight
in the United States in terms of its impact upon the
human rights of prisoners. In particular, she comments
on the disparity between the effective monitoring that
takes place overseas, as compared to the lack of it
within the United States.
Stern, V. (1998). Keeping the rules: The supervisors and
the inspectors. In A sin against the future:
Imprisonment in the World (pp. 225-247). Boston:
Northeastern University Press.
Stern reviews a variety of prison oversight mechanisms
including boards of visitors (U.K.), judges (France and
Europe), public prosecutors (East and Central Europe,
China), courts (U.S.), and ombudsmen (U.K.), and
discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of each
approach. She also describes international mechanisms,
such as the European Commission and the Court for
Human Rights, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee
and the Commission on Human Rights. Finally, she
discusses the role of national inspectors, such as the
Prisons Inspectorate of England and Wales, and
international inspectors such as CPT and NGOs.
Walmsley, R. (1996). Inspection and the protection of the
rights of prisoners (EPR rules 4 and 5). In Prison
systems in Central and Eastern Europe: Progress,
problems and the international standards (pp. 4853). Publication series no. 29. Helsinki, Finland:
European Institute for Crime Prevention and
Control, affiliated with the United Nations.
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Walmsley describes the European Prison Rules (EPR)
relevant to inspections (rules 4 and 5) and evaluates
individual countries‘ methods of complying with them.
He creates a table that indicates for each country
whether each of the following bodies conducts prison
inspections: the prison administration, the responsible
ministry (e.g., Ministry of Justice or Internal Affairs), or
an independent official body (e.g., prosecutor or
parliamentary body). He notes that while all the
countries offer some form of inspection to comply with
the EPR, differences remain among the types of bodies
employed by each nation and the level of development of
such roles.
In addition, most countries have an
independent inspector, which is usually the prosecutor‘s
office. Certain complications arise, however, regarding
the possible conflict in simultaneously prosecuting the
accused and examining conditions of detention. Finally,
the author describes legislative and non-governmental
oversight.
III. Models of Oversight in the United States
A. Independent Oversight Generally
Beck, J., Hall-Martinez, K., Smith, A. S., & Walker, L.
(2006, February 9). Beyond Government Oversight
Panel.
Transcript of Proceedings from
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s
Prisons – 4th Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010,
from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/
public_hearing_4.asp
The primary topic of the panel involved the role of nongovernmental actors and organizations in prison
oversight. Speakers from various organizations, such as
Stop Prisoner Rape, the Correctional Association of New
York‘s Prison Visiting Project, and the Massachusetts
Correctional Legal Services‘ Rapid Response to
Brutality Project expressed their perspectives on the
role of NGOs in correctional oversight.
Both
transparency and accountability of prisons for the
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protection of prisoners‘ rights was a central concern of
the speakers.
Cate, M., Deitch, M., & Yeomans, W. (2006, February 8).
Government Oversight of Prisons and Jails Panel.
Transcript of Proceedings from Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/public_hearing_
4.asp
Panelists covered different aspects of prison and jail
oversight.
Topics ranged from discussing the key
elements of effective oversight to particular examples of
federal and state oversight. Particular emphasis was
placed on the need for oversight findings to be made
public, thereby increasing public involvement in the
process.
Chunn, G. (Feb. 8th, 2006). Testimony for the Hearing of
the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s
Prisons. Written Testimony Submitted to the
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s
Prisons – 4th Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010,
from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/
statements/chunn_gwendolyn_c.pdf
Chunn provides a general history and overview of the
American Correctional Association (ACA). Also
discussed within the statement are the certification and
training opportunities available to prison staff and
officials who are members of the ACA.
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons
(2006). Confronting Confinement. Vera Institute
of Justice.
Retrieved May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/Confrontin
g_Confinement.pdf
One section of this comprehensive report on conditions
in America‘s prisons deals with oversight and
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accountability issues.
The report recommends the
development of independent government correctional
oversight mechanisms, as well as the creation of a
national non-governmental body with the expertise to
inspect facilities at the invitation of correctional
administrators.
The report further recommends
strengthening accountability within the correctional
profession, educating and involving the public with
regard to prison conditions, and reinvigorating
investigation and enforcement mechanisms for abuses of
prisoners. The findings and recommendations of this
commission grew out of four hearings held around the
country at which a wide variety of domestic and
international experts addressed the commission
members.
Deitch, M. (2010). Independent Correctional Oversight
Mechanisms Across the United States: A 50-State
Inventory.
30 Pace Law Review 1754 (2010).
www.law.pace.edu/plr
This massive report seeks to identify every independent
correctional oversight body in the United States, and
provides contact information and a short description of
each of these entities. It is the most comprehensive
such listing available and also provides charts that
visually depict the types of oversight that exist in each
state. The report provides a baseline against which
each jurisdiction can assess the extent of correctional
oversight in that jurisdiction. It also provides a quick
reference guide for those stakeholders interested in a
variety of models of prison and jail oversight, and shows
major gaps in the systems in the United States for
monitoring prison and jail conditions and the treatment
of prisoners. Although the report is thick with examples
of entities that perform (or have the authority to
perform) some kind of oversight function, a close
examination of these descriptions reveals that formal
and comprehensive external oversight—in the form of
inspections and routine monitoring of conditions that
affect the rights of prisoners—is truly rare in the United
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States. Even more elusive are forms of oversight that
seek to promote both public transparency of correctional
institutions and accountability for the protection of
human rights. The work is intended to spark discussion
and debate regarding the extent of prison oversight in
the United States and to stimulate creative thinking
about the ways that oversight bodies can be structured.
B. The Use of Litigation
Bronstein, A., Hanlon, S., & Thompson, M. (2006,
February 9). Litigation as Oversight Panel.
Transcript of Proceedings from Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/public_hearing_
4.asp
This panel discussion addressed the ways that litigation
and court intervention can protect prisoners‘ rights.
Panelists included Alvin Bronstein, Director Emeritus
of the National Prison Project, who spoke about how
court-ordered monitoring has historically been the
principal form of correctional oversight in the U.S.;
Stephen Hanlon, a lawyer in numerous prison class
action lawsuits, who focused on the negative impacts of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on the ability
of courts to protect prisoners; and Federal District
Judge Myron Thompson, who discussed the role that
judges, through the sentencing mechanism, can play in
prison oversight.
Panelists generally agreed that
litigation had provided for successful oversight in many
instances, but all agreed that the PLRA had hampered
more recent attempts to achieve oversight through
litigation.
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Bronstein, A.J. (2006, February 9). The Role of Litigation
in Correctional Oversight. Written Testimony
Submitted to the Commission on Safety and
Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th Hearing.
Retrieved
on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/bro
nstein_alvin_j.pdf
Alvin Bronstein traces the rise and fall of litigation as a
means of correctional oversight in the United States,
from the hands-off approach of the courts in the 19th
century, to the active involvement of the courts in the
late 20th century, until the passage of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act in 1996, which decreased the
frequency and efficacy of litigation as a means to
address human rights violations in prisons. Bronstein
concludes by advocating for a human rights approach to
the problems of crime and imprisonment.
Hanlon, S.F. (2006, February 9). Written Remarks.
Written Testimony Submitted to the Commission
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/hanl
on_stephen_f.pdf
Stephen Hanlon‘s remarks trace recent Supreme Court
case law in prison litigation, as well as explain the
impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). He
comments that these legal developments have made it
increasingly difficult for prisoners to litigate issues,
partly because case law has imposed significant burdens
of proof upon plaintiffs, and in part because the PLRA
can often make it difficult for plaintiff attorneys to
recover legal fees in prison litigation.
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Symposium. Prison Reform Revisited: The Unfinished
Agenda [Special issue]. 24 (2) Pace Law Review
(2004). Individual papers from this volume are
available online. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/
lawrev/index.2.html
This important volume contains numerous papers
presented at a conference on prison reform litigation.
The invitation-only conference included participants
from all stakeholder groups, including prison officials,
attorneys, advocates, judges, lawmakers, and scholars.
The papers address topics such as the accomplishments
and failures of litigation, the modern American penal
system, the anatomy of a prisoner‘s rights lawsuit, the
international context of U.S. prison reform, and the
future of reform efforts. This conference, held at Pace
Law School in 2004, was the precursor to the Texas
conference on prison oversight in 2006.
Thompson, M.H. (2006, February 9). Written Statement.
Written Testimony Submitted to the Commission
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/tho
mpson_myron_h.pdf
Judge Myron Thompson begins by observing that it is a
state‘s responsibility to ensure that prison conditions
meet constitutional standards—not the responsibility of
the federal government, and not the responsibility of
federal judges. Thus courts should only intervene when
states fail to fulfill the obligation to fix constitutional
violations. Consequently, judicial oversight of prisons is
limited in that it is purely reactionary in nature, and
not preventative. Moreover, judicial oversight can only
look to the floor of what is required by the constitution.
Thus, it is a mistake to look to court oversight as a
means of significant prison reform.
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Yeomans, W. (2006, February 9). Statement. Written
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing.
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/yeo
mans_william.pdf
William Yeomans discusses the role of the Civil Rights
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in
investigating
prison
abuses,
misconduct,
and
unconstitutional
conditions,
and
in
enforcing
constitutional requirements with regard to correctional
facilities. Among the tools available to the Justice
Department are criminal and civil proceedings and the
option to negotiate settlement agreements with
correctional administrators that can be monitored by
Justice Department officials.
He also calls for
Congressional review of the Civil Rights Division, in
order to ensure that it continues to strongly enforce
federal law and constitutional norms.
C. Federal System
Fine, G. (2005, April 19). Statement. Written Testimony
Submitted to the Commission on Safety and
Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 1st Hearing.
Retrieved
on
February
8,
2010,
from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/fine
_glenn.pdf
As Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Justice
(which includes the Federal Bureau of Prisons), Fine
explains that a portion of his office‘s responsibilities
includes investigating, auditing, and inspecting prisons,
especially in response to allegations of misconduct by
prison officials. Fine‘s testimony provides background
about the structure and authority of the OIG, as well as
statistics about prison abuse investigations and
descriptions of some systemic reviews conducted by the
office on issues relevant to prisoner abuse.
The
Inspector General, who is selected by the President and
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confirmed by the Senate, reports to Congress and the
U.S. Attorney General, and is granted subpoena power
and access to government files. Fine believes that a
system similar to his office, one that is well-funded and
fully independent, is critical to deter prison abuse from
occurring.
D. Specific States’ Models
1. California
Bobb,

M. (2006, February 9). Statement. Written
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/bob
b_merrick.pdf
In his role as Special Counsel to the Los Angeles County
Board of Supervisors, Bobb monitors the Los Angeles
County jails. He discusses different jurisdictions‘ efforts
to incorporate civilian oversight of misconduct in these
jails, for example, through Seattle‘s use of a civilian
lawyer to head the Internal Affairs unit, to the Office of
Independent Review in Los Angeles, and finally, San
Francisco‘s utilization of a citizen‘s review board. He
ends by advocating for an oversight system similar to
Seattle‘s and the Office of Independent Review,
specifically one that promotes internal accountability
while still ensuring a failsafe against biased and
incompetent investigations through the use of civilian
oversight groups.

Cate, M. (Feb. 8th, 2006). Letter to Prison Commission.
Written Testimony Submitted to the Commission
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/cate
_matthew.pdf
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Then-California Inspector General Matthew Cate
describes California‘s model for providing prison
oversight. The California OIG is an independent agency
with the mandate to inspect prison facilities for adults
and juveniles and to investigate incidents of abuse.
Since 2005, the OIG has had the ability to release its
findings publicly, and Cate believes that this model has
helped achieve positive results within the California
prisons and enhance public confidence.
Gennaco, M. (2005). Toward Increased Transparency in
the Jails and Prisons: Some Optimistic Signs.
Written Testimony Submitted to the Commission
on Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 1st
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/gen
naco_mike.pdf
Michael Gennaco heads the Office of Independent
Review, the civilian oversight agency that monitors the
Los Angeles County Sheriff‘s Department to ensure that
allegations of officer misconduct are investigated fairly
and adequately.
His testimony describes the
involvement of the OIR in certain investigations and he
notes that the agency can investigate and report on
critical incidents in the jail allegations against the
department at the same time that internal
investigations are proceeding. The OIR is free to reach
its own conclusions, as well as to challenge the Sheriff‘s
Department on certain practices or incidents. Gennaco
observes that internal tracking mechanisms regarding
patterns of misconduct on the part of jail staff lag far
behind similar tracking systems for police departments.
He also stresses the importance of correctional facilities‘
allowing public access and routine monitoring visits by
advocacy groups.
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2. Illinois
Young, M. (2006). The Promise and Challenge of Citizen
Oversight and Visits to Prison. Written statement
to the Commission on Safety and Abuse in
America‘s Prisons—4th Hearing. Retrieved on May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/you
ng_malcom.pdf
Malcolm Young, the Executive Director of the John
Howard Association, a citizen oversight group that has
monitored conditions in Illinois prisons since 1901,
provides an overview of citizen oversight of corrections.
He provides an historical overview of the work of the
John Howard Association and notes that the
organization‘s prison visiting program currently brings
over a thousand citizen volunteers a year into the state‘s
prisons, jails, and juvenile detention facilities. Access is
at the discretion of the prison agency. Observing that
funding issues are directly related to the independence
of the oversight mechanism, Young addresses the
important issue of how such citizen oversight should be
financially supported and discusses the pros and cons of
oversight bodies receiving grant funding, consulting
fees, and government support.
3. Massachusetts
Department of Correction Advisory Council.
(2005,
October 25). The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Department of Correction Advisory Council Final
Report.
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/doc/doc_final_rep
ort.pdf
The Department of Correction Advisory Council (DCAC)
of Massachusetts was formed in 2004 to establish a plan
for reducing the rate of re-offense among inmates.
Toward this end, the DCAC performed a thorough audit
of the Massachusetts prison system, and issued this
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report that makes a number of recommendations aimed
at improving accountability, ensuring fairness, and
fostering fiscal accountability. The report also draws
heavily on the earlier findings of the Governor‘s
Commission on Corrections Reform.
Among its
recommendations is the appointment of an Independent
Inspector General who would be fully independent of
the state prison system. The DCAC report argues that
an Inspector General would be uniquely equipped to
discern legitimate grievances from mere rhetoric,
reinforcing the state where it is right and holding it
accountable where it is wrong. The document also
addresses concerns associated with any infringement
that an Inspector General may have on prison security.
Harshbarger, S. (2006, February 9). Implementing
Corrections Reform: A Major Public Safety
Challenge and Opportunity. Written Testimony
Submitted to the Commission on Safety and
Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th Hearing.
Retrieved
on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/hars
hbarger_scott.pdf
In his role as Chair of the Governor‘s Commission for
Corrections
Reform
in
Massachusetts,
Scott
Harshbarger discusses the Commission‘s role in
monitoring the state‘s Department of Corrections.
Although acknowledging that independent oversight is a
critical component of a properly run prison system, he
also emphasizes that in order to function properly, the
system needs effective leadership and administration,
as well as support from the executive and legislative
branches.
He identifies the role that such an
independent oversight body should play within a state
system, especially in terms of its interaction with other
state bodies, and notes that the Commission called for
the appointment of an inspector general and enhanced
external oversight of corrections in Massachusetts.
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4. New York
Beck,

J. (2006, February 9). Testimony. Written
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing.
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/beck
_jack.pdf
The Correctional Association of New York is one of only
two non-governmental organizations in the United
States that enjoy legislative authority to access prisons
and to issue public reports on their findings. Jack Beck,
the director of the Prison Visiting Project of the
Correctional Association of New York, details the
structure of the organization and gives examples of its
oversight work. He also identifies a number of factors
that are crucial to any outside organization that
monitors and inspects prisons, including independence,
access to information, and the ability to make reports
available to the public.

Beck, J. (2007, December 6). Testimony before the
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission.
Retrieved
on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/nprec/
20090820160927/http://nprec.us/docs3/Beck%20Test
imony.pdf
Beck‘s testimony before the National Prison Rape
Elimination Commission details the unique opportunity
that the Correctional Association of New York has in
monitoring New York‘s prisons.
He discusses the
challenges faced by outside agencies that monitor issues
of sexual misconduct and identifies the key factors that
make an oversight body effective.
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Correctional Association of New York. (2005). State of
the prisons 2002-2003: Conditions of confinement
in 14 New York state correctional facilities. New
York:
Correctional Association of New York.
Retrieved
on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publicatio
ns/download/pvp/State_of_prisons_02-03.pdf
The Correction Association describes its typical prison
visit. Typically, five to eight inspection team members
visit facilities‘ cellblocks and dormitories, yard, medical
clinic, classrooms, and activity areas.
Two staff
members are also allowed to interview inmates in
solitary Special Housing Units. They also meet with an
Inmate Liaison Committee, as well as with corrections
administrators and staff. The report also describes the
types of questionnaires that the researchers use.
5. Ohio
Pope, S. (2006). The Work of the Ohio Correctional
Institution Inspection Committee: Reflections and
Analysis. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.ciic.state.oh.us/reports/randa3-1606.pdf
This detailed description and analysis of the operations
of Ohio‘s Correctional Institution Inspection Committee
(CIIC) was presented at the Texas conference entitled
―Opening Up a Closed World: What Constitutes
Effective Prison Oversight?‖ The CIIC is unique as an
oversight body in that it is structured as a legislative
committee yet it conducts routine inspections of prison
facilities and issues reports on its findings.
The
committee is comprised of state legislators and a fulltime staff of professional correctional inspectors.
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6. Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Prison Society website. Retrieved on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.prisonsociety.org/adv/ov.shtml
This 200-year old organization advocates for prisoners
in a variety of ways. In terms of oversight, it has an
Officials Visitors program that makes thousands of
visits to prisoners each year in order to monitor prison
conditions and assist with individual or systemic prison
problems. These visitors are all volunteers and state
law provides them with authority to carry out these
visits.
7. Texas
Johnson, G.L. (2006, February 8). Remarks. Written
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing.
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/john
son_gary.pdf
Gary Johnson, the former director of the Texas prison
system, comments upon the benefits of oversight,
specifically, how it prevents complacency on the part of
prison officials, as well as how it helps maintain rules
and standards within an institution. Having lived
through judicial oversight of Texas prisons during the
Ruiz case, he discusses the difficult transition period
during which prison officials gradually became
accustomed to oversight. He also addresses the tension
between the benefits of external oversight and the
dangers and limitations that such oversight may also
entail. Since the termination of court oversight, Texas
prisons have moved towards developing relationships
with external accrediting bodies such as the American
Correctional Association. Johnson also discusses the
risks of having oversight responsibilities conducted by
non-professional entities with advocacy agendas.
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Reynolds, C. (2004, Spring). Effective self-monitoring of
correctional conditions. 24 Pace Law Review 769792 (2004). Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawrev/18/
Carl Reynolds, then-General Counsel for the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), examines how
TDCJ developed internal review mechanisms to
increase the agency‘s accountability and transparency
following the termination of court oversight in the Ruiz
case. The article describes various TDCJ internal
review methods, including: emergency action center
daily reports and monthly statistics that list serious and
unusual events; serious incident, grievance, and use of
force reviews; operational review and risk management;
medical monitoring; investigations by an inspector
general; internal audits; and policy reviews. Reynolds
also notes that the agency sought technical assistance
from the National Institute of Corrections on projects
regarding administrative segregation and mentally ill
offenders, as well as on use of force reviews.
IV. Oversight of Specific Prison Issues
A. Private Prisons
Aman, A.C. (2005). Privatization, Prisons, Democracy,
and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the
Province of Administrative Law. Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies 511-50 (Summer 2002).
Professor Aman focuses upon problems with prison
privatization, one of which is the failure of most states
to include human rights provisions in statutes
authorizing contracts with private prisons. To remedy
this ill, Aman recommends the creation of a Model
Privatization Code that incorporates provisions
protecting prisoner‘s human rights, as well as fostering
public participation on this issue. In order for the
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government to retain accountability for private prisons,
Aman also asserts that: (1) the government must have
the ability to ―step-in‖ and reclaim any portion of a
privately run prison; and (2) any privatization contract
must be limited in its duration. The latter provision
allows more public input into the privatization process,
as do a number of other approaches set forth in the
article. He also advocates for the creation of inspection
mechanisms modeled on the British Prison Inspectorate
and for the application of the Administrative Procedures
Act to private operators so that private providers will be
more publicly accountable for ensuring the human
rights of prisoners.
Bachman, D.D. (1997). Monitoring and Accountability.
Paper presented at the National Workshop on
Private Prisons, Oklahoma City, November 2-4,
1997.
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.doc.state.ok.us/field/private_prisons/m
onitoring_and_accountability.pdf
This paper, available on the website of Oklahoma‘s
Department of Corrections, discusses the importance of
an effective monitoring process to ensure accountability
in the operation of private prisons. Bachman describes
how standards must be constructed collaboratively
between the state and the prison contractor. The author
also discusses the strengths and limitations of two
models of monitor selection: a full-time on-site monitor
versus an outside agent.
He also notes that a
combination of the two is used by several agencies. The
essay closes with a description of monitoring methods,
including the scheduling of visits, provisions for written
reports, corrective plans of action, a mechanism for
making decisions and resolving disputes, and sanctions
for non-compliance.
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Camp, S.D., Gaes, G.G., Klein-Saffran, J., Daggett, D.M.,
& Saylor, W.G. (2002). ―Using inmate survey data
in assessing prison performance: A case study
comparing private and public prisons.‖ 27 (1)
Criminal Justice Review 26-51 (2002).
The authors demonstrate how surveys of inmates can be
used to compare the performance of private and public
prisons with regard to gang management, safety and
security, sanitation, and food service delivery. They
argue that surveys should not replace operational
reviews and audits but should be used in concert with
such traditional mechanisms.
Such surveys are
inexpensive to distribute and findings were generally
similar to the views expressed by guards, if not more
reliable, indicating that prison staff and administration
should be receptive to such methodologies for gathering
information.
Collins, W. (2000). Contracting for correctional services
provided by private firms. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Justice, 36-42. Retrieved on May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.asca.net/documents/contract.pdf
In his discussion of monitoring private prison facilities,
Collins stresses the need to balance a focus on
compliance with specific rules with a broader
understanding of the ―climate‖ of the prison. He also
distinguishes between ―quality control,‖ which is a form
of self-monitoring on the part of private prison
administrators and ―quality assurance,‖ which is
executed by the government. The text also outlines
several enforcement mechanisms, including corrective
action plans, liquidated damages, incentive awards,
dispute resolution, and, if all else fails, actual
termination of the contract.
Harding, R.W.
(1997).
Private Prisons and Public
Accountability. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers.
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Harding outlines a standard for contract monitoring for
private prisons. An important step in his model is
allowing both public and private operators to bid on
contracts.
This would encourage a cross-fertilized
system and one in which both public and private
institutions necessarily functioned under the same
standards. This, argues Harding, avoids significant
disparities in conditions. Harding acknowledges that
his model does not necessarily solve issues of favoritism
and may, in fact, make government operators more
vulnerable to it.
Keating, J.M., Jr.
(1990). ―Public Over Private:
Monitoring the Performance
of Privately
Operated Prisons and Jails.‖ In McDonald, D.C.
[Ed.], Private Prisons and the Public Interest (pp.
130-54). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press.
Keating describes a variety of accountability measures
for privately-run prisons, noting the importance of
oversight due to the frequent tension between the profit
motive and the protection of human rights. In the
chapter,
Keating
outlines
several
monitoring
mechanisms, including contract monitoring, document
review, observation, financial audit, accreditation,
administrative mechanisms—including the appointment
of an ombudsman and grievance commission—and
public scrutiny.
McAfee, W.M. (1987). Tennessee‘s Private Prison Act of
1986: An Historical Perspective with Special
Attention
to
California‘s
Experience.
40
Vanderbilt Law Review 851-65 (May 1987).
The author points out that the expense of state
monitoring is one of the hidden costs of the private
prison system. He relates the experiences of a number
of states that established external monitoring systems
to conduct oversight of these private prisons.
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B. Sexual Assault in Prison
Hall-Martinez, K. (2006, February 9). Stop Prisoner
Rape: Monitoring and Collaborating with
Government to End Prison Rape. Written
Testimony Submitted to the Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America‘s Prisons – 4th
Hearing. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/hallmartinez_katherine.pdf
As co-executive director of Stop Prisoner Rape (now
―Just Detention International‖), a non-governmental
organization, Hall-Martinez describes the role that her
organization plays in prison oversight by increasing
awareness and transparency of prison conditions and
sexual assault in prison. The group also plans to
educate and train prison officials on human rights in
the hopes of bringing about policy change.
Mariner, J. (2001). No escape: Male rape in U.S. prisons.
New York: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.ht
ml
In addition to describing the frequency of prison rape,
its horrific impact on prisoners, and the legal
protections that exist, this important report describes
how the lack of an independent oversight mechanism
has contributed to the problem of sexual assault in
prison. The author notes that few correctional facilities
participate in ACA‘s accreditation process, and that the
effectiveness of judicial oversight has declined in recent
years.
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Rothstein, M. and Stannow, L. (2009, July). Improving
Prison Oversight to Address Sexual Violence in
Detention. Brief of the American Constitution
Society for Law and Policy. Retrieved May 20,
2010,
from
http://www.justdetention.org/pdf/ACSBrief.pdf
This brief provides an overview of the problem of sexual
abuse in American prisons and jails, and discusses the
standards developed by the National Prison Rape
Elimination Commission (PREA standards).
The
authors note that the PREA standards require incident
reviews, data collection, and independent audits of
correctional facilities as a means of ensuring
accountability in compliance with the standards. The
brief advocates for increased monitoring of prison
conditions that give rise to sexual abuse, as well as
effective monitoring of compliance with PREA
standards.
Thomas, D., et al. (1996). All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse
of Women in U.S. State Prisons. New York: Human
Rights Watch. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.aclu.org/hrc/PrisonsStates.pdf
An exhaustive report that describes applicable laws
regarding sexual assault in prison and compares the
situations of California, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, and New York, with a focus
on the occurrence of sexual abuse, the system‘s
response, and recommendations. The report finds that
nearly every state reviewed lacked accountability to
external monitors, and the authors highlight the need
for independent oversight.
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C. Mental Health/Disability
The Correctional Association of New York. (2004).
Mental health in the house of corrections: A study
of mental health care in New York state prisons.
New York: The Correctional Association of New
York. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publicatio
ns/download/pvp/issue_reports/Mental-Health.pdf
The Correctional Association of New York has statutory
authority to monitor conditions in New York‘s prison
facilities, and this report describes the methodology the
organization used to investigate issues related to
correctional mental health care. The investigators
conducted site visits between November 2001 and
January 2003. The staff took notes, reviewed inmate
records, observed facility operations, inspected mental
health units, and conducted surveys with inmates and
staff. The study used both quantitative and qualitative
measures and the analysis was guided by secondary
data and policy analysis.
Human Rights Watch. (2003). Ill Equipped: U.S. Prisons
and Offenders with Mental Illness. New York:
Human Rights Watch. Retrieved on May 20, 2010,
from http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/10/21/illequipped
This important report by the international advocacy
group Human Rights Watch (HRW) finds that America‘s
prisons house three times more mentally ill individuals
than the country‘s mental health facilities, and that
prisons are often ill-equipped to treat such offenders.
The report advocates several critical oversight
measures, and argues that independent mental health
experts should be given full access to prison medical
records, staff, and prisoners. These experts should
monitor the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners, the
availability of qualified staff and adequate facilities,
types of therapeutic interventions, as well as policies
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National Council on Disability, American
University, School of International Service, &
Mental Disability Rights International. (2005,
October
24).
Monitoring
Symposium:
A
Contribution to the Formulation of Proposals for
Monitoring a United Nations Convention on the
Rights of People with Disabilities Report.
Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from U.S. National
Council
on
Disability
Web
site:
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2005/p
df/symposium.pdf
While not directly related to prison issues, this report
offers an interesting perspective on the creation of
monitoring mechanisms to enforce a United Nations
convention on the rights of persons with disabilities.
The report compares currently established monitoring
mechanisms, such as the OECD peer review system and
the CPT torture inspections. Symposium participants
indicated that the development of a monitoring
mechanism should address the following issues:
adherence to human rights, transparency, capacity
building and technical assistance, coordinating
stakeholders, neutrality and expertise, adversarial
versus cooperative processes, and lessons learned.

D. Police Oversight
Bobb, M. (2003). Civilian Oversight of the Police in the
United States. 22 St. Louis University Public Law
Review 151 (2003). Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from
http://www.parc.info/client_files/Articles/1%20%20Civilian%20Oversight%20of%20the%20Police%
20%28Bobb%202003%29.pdf
Merrick Bobb, the longtime police monitor for Los
Angeles and head of a resource center focusing on best
practices in police oversight, discusses the limitations of
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internal police investigations and describes various
options for placing police agencies under heightened
civilian oversight and control. Those options include the
use of independent monitors (such as his role in Los
Angeles), independent investigators (for example, the
Office of Independent Review in Los Angeles and the
Office of Professional Accountability in Seattle), and the
more commonly seen civilian review boards. In extreme
cases, the federal government can also intervene and
subject the police agency to settlement agreements and
ongoing monitoring.
Chech, M. (2005). Legislative Oversight of Police: Lessons
Learned
from
the
Police
Handling
of
Demonstrations in Washington D.C. 32 Notre
Dame Journal of Legislation (2005). Retrieved on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=852765
This article argues that local legislative oversight and
legislative investigations of police policies and practices
are the most effective mechanism to ensure law
enforcement compliance with human rights standards.
The benefits of legislative oversight include an ability to
address policies on a broader systemic level, greater
police cooperation, and an ability to move forward at a
relatively faster speed than litigation, when compared
to more traditional police oversight mechanisms. The
article outlines the keys to successful legislative
investigation, identifies the shortcomings of this
oversight model, and cautions that no one model of
oversight is enough when it comes to police misconduct.
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Gordon-Reed, A. (1995). Watching the Protectors:
Independent Oversight of Municipal Law
Enforcement Agencies. New York Law School Law
Review 87-111 (1995).
Recognizing that police and corrections officers hold a
great deal of power over people in their custody, GordonReed argues that outside scrutiny and oversight is
especially appropriate in this arena. Using the New
York City Board of Corrections as a model, she traces
the mid-1990‘s debate between the mayor and the city
council of New York over the creation of a new,
independent oversight committee for the City‘s police
department. She presents her perspective on the role
that oversight serves, the problems oversight can create,
and how such an oversight agency should be structured
in order to accomplish its mission.
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Lemgruber, J. (2002, September). Civilian Oversight of
the Police in Brazil: The case of the ombudsman’s
offices. Center for Studies on Public Security and
Citizenship (Centro de Estudos de Segurança e
Cidadania / CESeC) at the University Candido
Mendes. Retrieved on May 20, 2010, from Centro
de Estudios de Justicia de las America‘s Website:
http://www.cejamericas.org/doc/documentos/cesce
c-civilian-oversight.pdf
CESeC evaluated police ombudsman‘s offices in five
Brazilian states in order to describe and evaluate
routines, to determine the satisfaction by both citizens
who had lodged complaints and by police officers who
were the targets of complaints, to compare the
ombudsman approach with other models of civilian
oversight, and to propose a new model that contributes
to democratic policies. The author, Julita Lemgruber,
was herself an Ombudsman before becoming the
director of the CESeC. The external control comes from
the Public Prosecutor‘s Office which is midway between
the executive and the judiciary branches, giving it a
margin of independence the author argues is equivalent
to or greater than many of the civilian oversight
mechanisms around the world. The report contains
numerous suggestions for the improvement of this
oversight mechanism and ends with some basic
parameters for evaluation of impact.
National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law
Enforcement (2010). www.nacole.org
NACOLE is a national association of organizations that
provide oversight of police and other law enforcement
agencies. The association‘s website contains a wealth of
resources about the police oversight bodies that exist in
the United States and internationally, and provides
links to numerous articles about this topic. NACOLE
also holds an annual conference, offers professional
standards for oversight entities, and sponsors a listserv
with frequent articles about oversight-related topics.
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Quinn, S. (2009, October). Models of Civilian Oversight in
the United States: Similarities, Differences,
Expectations and Resources. Retrieved on May 20,
2010,
from
http://www.keywestcity.com/egov/docs/2572912578
85436.pdf
This relatively short paper is packed with information
about the different police oversight models used around
the United States. It has helpful comparisons of the
different models in use by examining the strengths and
weaknesses of each model.
It also describes the
appropriate use of public documents and offers readers
tips on how to start the process of creating an oversight
body.
Stone, C. (2005, October). Police Accountability and the
Quality of Oversight. Summary of Conference on
Police Accountability and the Quality of
Oversight: Global Trends in National Context.
Retrieved
on
May
20,
2010,
from
http://www.altus.org/pdf/cs_spac_oct2005_en.pdf
This excellent paper summarizes the discussions from a
major international conference on police accountability
and identifies six major questions that emerged from
plenary sessions.
Those six overarching questions
frame the paper, and include topics such as: to whose
standards the police should be held accountable; the
definition of success in police oversight; the division of
labor between external and internal oversight
mechanisms; the role the media has to play in police
oversight; the potential oversight contributions of nongovernmental organizations; and the role of research.
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Walker, S. (2005).
Accountability.
Publications.

The New World of
Thousand
Oaks:
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The book begins by examining traditional methods of
police accountability, such as oversight through the
courts and the legislature, and identifies the
accomplishments and limitations of these oversight
methods.
It also explores internal oversight
mechanisms such as use of force reporting and
administrative strategies such as internal affairs
investigations. Author Samuel Walker argues, however,
that the there are new monitoring tools that provide
more effective oversight of the police. One of these new
mechanisms is the auditor model of police oversight,
which he favors over civilian review boards because the
auditor model focuses on organizational change. The
book ends with an evaluation of the continued success of
this new oversight mechanism and highlights the
potential it has for controlling day-to-day police work,
enhancing frontline supervision, and for preventing
misconduct in the first place.
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